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Abstract 
Financial innovation has increased opportunities for diversification and lowered 
investment costs, but has not reduced the relative cost of active (informed) investment 
strategies compared with passive (less informed) strategies. What are the consequences? I 
have studied an economy with linear production technologies, some more risky than others. 
Investors can use low quality public information or collect high quality, but costly, private 
information. Information helps in avoiding excessively risky investments. Financial 
innovation lowers the incentives for private information collection and causes a deterioration 
in public information: the economy more often invests in excessively risky technologies. 
This changes the properties of the business cycle and can reduce welfare by increasing the 
likelihood of “liquidation crises". 
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* Bank of Italy and International Monetary Fund.    1 Introduction
Financial innovation is \exemplied by new derivative contracts, new corporate securities,
new forms of pooled investment products, [...] or by new means of distributing securities
and processing transactions" (Tufano [2002]). Indeed, in the last two decades, the US
have witnessed a tremendous increase in the types of securities available to investors and
a decrease in the cost of holding and trading them. Traditionally, economists have viewed
the process of nancial innovation as benecial for two sets of reasons. First of all it
spurs growth, thanks to the greater easiness with which funds ow from agents with low
productive projects towards agents with high productive projects (Levine [1997], Rajan
and Zingales [1998], Azariadis and Kass [2003], among others). Second, the amount of
risk that investors bear is reduced, as a consequence of the availability of a broader menu
of assets, allowing greater diversication and risk sharing (Merton [1987], Mendoza et
al. [2008]). This traditional view has recently come under attack, particularly on the
part where it predicates that nancial development leads to risk reductions for investors.
Indeed, some authors wonder whether nancial development has made the world riskier
and subject to \excessive risk taking" (Rajan [2005]), while others plainly state, with
respect to securitization, that its \positive role [...] in dispersing risk" is an \old view, now
discredited" (Shin [2009]).
This paper intends to contribute to the ongoing debate by highlighting the role of costly
information collection as a channel, largely neglected by the literature, through which -
nancial innovation shapes the amount and types of risk that investors choose to hold, the
characteristics of aggregate economic uctuations and, nally, welfare. Using data provided
by French [2008] I nd evidence that, for the US stock market, nancial innovation was not
accompanied by a reduction in the relative cost of active (i.e. more informed) trading com-
pared to the cost of passive (less informed) trading. What are the possible consequences of
this phenomenon? To answer this question I develop a theoretical model where agents learn
about the quality of investment opportunities by choosing either to be active investors and
acquire costly private information or to be passive and rely on less costly, but less precise,
public information. Information is valuable because it avoids making low quality invest-
ments, which are investments in excessively risky technologies. Following the literature on
noisy trading (Grossman and Stiglitz [1980], Kyle [1985], Summers and Shleifer [1990]) the
overall amount of private information collected by active investors determines a positive
externality on the precision of the public information. Under various assumptions on as-
sets returns, I show that nancial innovation leads to a decrease in the amount on private
information collection whenever it is not accompanied by a reduction in the cost of invest-
ing actively relative to the cost of investing passively. The reason is that information is a
* I would like to thank Fabrizio Perri, Timothy Kehoe, Patrick Kehoe and two anonymous referees
for useful comments. The initial draft of this paper was written while at the Bank of Italy. The views
expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of the International Monetary Fund or of
the Bank of Italy. Contact information: tel.: (+001) 202 623 4825; e-mail: rpiazza@imf.org.
5strategic substitute to risk diversication. Financial innovation has positive welfare eects
because it provides \insurance" to investors, by allowing them to trade a larger set of assets
and thus to better diversify risk. However, as in a standard moral hazard problem, greater
insurance reduces incentives to take costly actions, such as collecting private information,
to avoid excessively risky investments. This theoretical nding is supported by a growing
body of literature (Cremers and Petajisto [2009], French[2008]) that shows how US stock
market holdings have consistently shifted form active to passive forms of investment in the
past 20 years. Information collection aects welfare and the business cycle properties. The
lower amount of private information collected, working through the externality of public
information, has a negative impact on the welfare of passive investors, thus partly counter-
balancing their gains from better risk sharing. With lower information, agents more often
mistakenly invest in technologies characterized by excessive systemic risk: I derive business
cycles statistics which incorporate the eects of information collection on the volatility and
sensitivity to systemic shocks of the aggregate productivity. With this respect, the model
adds a new theoretical perspective to the literature on the great moderation (Stock and
Watson [2002], Fogli and Perri [2006], Dynan et al. [2006], Stiroh [2009]).
Finally I show how, in a more dynamic setting with time varying risk, information cycles
arise. Financial development tends to reduce information collection in periods where ex-
cess risk is mainly idiosyncratic (and thus \insurable" through better diversication), but
has no impact on information collection in periods when excess risk is mainly systemic.
Consequently, nancial development increases the frequency of \liquidation crises". These
are situations when too risky investments are mistakenly undertaken in periods of idiosyn-
cratic excess risk, only to be suddenly liquidated when excess risk becomes systemic and
information collection soars. If liquidation crises impose aggregate costs to the economy,
then nancial development reduces welfare.
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical evi-
dence, Section 3 presents technologies, preferences, information revelation mechanism and
the equilibrium for the basic model. Section 4 extends the basic model to time varying risk
and analyzes liquidation crises. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical evidence
To substantiate our discussion, it is worthwhile to review a few points about nancial in-
novation. To this end, the US is an interesting reference country for which we have quite
abundant empirical evidence. The three facts that I emphasize are the following: a) there
has been a tremendous increase in the menu of assets and in diversication possibilities
available to investors b) liquidity and trading costs have trended downwards since the '60s,
but c) the cost of active investment strategies has not decreased relative to the cost of
passive strategies. Point a) is easily illustrated with some examples. High-yield bond is-
suances went from about $50 billions in 1993, when issuances were entirely in the US, to
6Figure 1: Cost of active and passive investment strategies (in % of investment) and relative cost
of active strategies. Active and passive Dened Benet pension funds (top). Composite active and
passive strategies (bottom). The data used are from French (2008). Details on strategy construction
are in Appendix E.
$180 billions in 2006, with the US share going down to 70% (BIS [2008]). During the same
period, the value of worldwide buyouts transactions undertaken by private equity funds
went from a scanty $30 billions to more than $800 billions (Kaplan and Str omberg [2009]).
The US market for asset-backed securities, that in 1998 was worth $271 billion, increased
four times in only a few years and reached over $1,200 billions in 2006 (Weaver [2008]).
Securitization in the US mortgage market, virtually absent two decades ago, reached 80.5%
of mortgages originated in 2006, for a total value of $2.4 trillions (Gorton [2008]). For the
purpose of our discussion, the most important conclusion to be drawn is that the suc-
cessful introduction of these new nancial instruments (high-yield bonds, private equity,
mortgage backed securities) opened up to investors new opportunities in markets (for high
risk rms, unlisted companies, housing) that before had more limited access to external
nancing, mostly provided by very specialized investors (e.g. banks). A number of studies
(for instance Jones [2002], French [2008]) conrm b) by establishing that trading costs in
the stock market have decreased over time due to reductions in both bid-ask spreads and
in trading fees. Things become more complicated when we want to investigate c), since it
7requires the dicult task of ranking investment strategies by their \information content"
and then of calculating the corresponding cost. The most comprehensive attempt to esti-
mate information costs has been done by French (2008), who reports cost series for various
investment strategies in the US stock market. Using these data, I analyze two alternative
cost measures for active and passive investments. The rst is the cost of active and passive
Dened Benet pension plans, while the second is the cost of composite active and passive
strategies comprising investments in mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds and direct
equity holding. Figure 1 presents the two cost measures, and Appendix E provides more
details on their construction. The common message is the following: the absolute cost of
passive strategies has been trending downwards over time, while the absolute cost of active
strategies has decreased to a much lesser extent. Consequently, the relative cost of active
strategies has signicantly increased over time, roughly doubling in the period 1991-2006.
Certainly, a more precise measure of information costs would take into consideration the
possibility that active strategies might have become much better in producing information.
Measuring information costs using this sort of quality-adjusted index could indeed reveal
that active investment strategies have not become, relative to passive strategies, as costly
as Figure 1 suggests. Nonetheless, as a rst order approximation, it seems reasonable to
argue that quality considerations would not be so strong as to invert the clear trend in
Figure 1.
The next section presents the basic model relating information collection to nancial inno-
vation. The model will allow us to highlight the consequences for the agents' risk taking
behavior, for the business cycle and for welfare of a nancial innovation process character-
ized by a)-b) and c).
3 The basic model
3.1 Technologies and information structure
The economy lasts two periods t = 1;2 and is endowed with 2N linear production technolo-
gies that use consumption goods at t = 1 as input and produce consumption goods at t = 2
as output. Technologies are evenly distributed distributed across N markets m = 1;:::;N,
so that each market is associated with exactly two technologies j = 1;2. Each technology
is uniquely identied by a pair (m;j). In every market m, one technology is low risk and
the other excess risk. The return on the excess risk technology in m is a mean preserving
spread of the return on the low risk technology in m. The realization of a random type
m 2 f1;2g decides that technology j = m is the excess risk technology in m (and thus
j = 3   m is the low risk technology in m). Call  = (1;:::;N) the vector of types
and T = f1;2gN the set of such vectors. Call rm;j the return between t = 1 and t = 2 of
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Figure 2: Economy divided in N = 4 markets. Within each market there are two linear technologies
j = 1;2 with random productivity rm;j. The realized type is  = (2;1;2;1) so technology j = 2
has excess risk in markets 1;3 and j = 1 has excess risk in markets 2;4.
technology (m;j) and assume that
rm;3 m = im (1)
rm;m = imemS (2)
The random variables im and em are i.i.d. across markets, while S is the systemic shock
common to all markets. All shocks are independent of each other. I normalize to unity the




S the variances of the shocks.
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of markets and technologies. The setup is
open to various interpretations. For instance, markets can represent dierent products,
or dierent groups of customers segmented by geographical area, wealth or income. For
every market, some choices of the production and marketing technologies are more risky
than others. For example, a certain production technology may rely too much on inputs
whose prices are very volatile, or a certain marketing strategy may target customers whose
payment ability is very uncertain. Excess risk is modeled as a mean preserving spread over
the low risk technology, in fact
rm;m = rm;3 m + zm
where the excess risk zm = im(emS   1) satises
E[zmjrm;3 m] = 0
9Given a realization of rm;3 m the source of excess risk in zm is twofold: excess idiosyncratic
risk em and excess systemic risk1 S.
The joint distribution of types is summarized by a probability function F() that
satises a symmetry condition
F() = F(1;:::;N) = F(3   1;:::;3   N) = F( ) (3)
for every  2 T. Condition (3) simply requires that the probability of realization of a type
 equals the probability of realization of its opposite type   dened as   = 3   . The
ad hoc assumption (3) greatly simplies our calculations but is not very restrictive, since
it encompasses a wide range of behaviors for the joint distribution of types. For instance,
consider the case of perfect positive correlation among market types m. Here the support
of F() is the pair of vectors 1 = (1;:::;1) and 2 = (2;:::;2). Assumption (3) then
simply requires that F(1) = F(2) = 1
2. To the other extreme, the case of i.i.d. types
automatically satises (3), since F() = 1
2N for any  2 T.
We are ready to describe the information structure of the economy, i.e. the way in
which information about the realization of  ows to the agents in the economy. For
now, we conveniently assume that the information structure is exogenously imposed to
the economy, but in Section 3.4 I will derive in detail the microeconomic mechanism that
allows this structure to emerge as an equilibrium outcome of the model.
First of all, at the beginning of time 1 all agents are informed that the current realization
of types satises  2 T where
T   [   (4)
In other words, after the types are realized the only initial uncertainty for agents is whether
the realized type is the true  or its opposite. Notice that, conditional on this information,
assumption (3) implies that the two types are equally likely. Next, agents have two ways
to further rene their knowledge. The rst is to become an active investor, a choice that
reduces the investor's wealth to a fraction2 1=A of its original value, with A > 1, and
allows the observation of a private signal IA() such that
IA() =  (5)
Alternatively, an investor can choose to be passive. Passive investors face investment costs
that reduce their wealth to a fraction 1=P, with 1 < P < A, but observe a public signal
IP(),
IP() = I (6)
1To reduce notation, I normalize to zero the amount of systemic risk in the diversiable technology
technologies. This has no qualitative eect on the results. A case with systemic risk also in the low risk
technology is presented in Section 4.
2This gives rise to a constant return to scale for information collection. For a analysis of increasing
returns technologies see Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2008).
10where I is a binary random variable, independent on , which equals 1 with probability
 2 [0;1] and zero otherwise. Active investors are able to take fully informed investment
decisions, but have to pay a high cost. Instead, passive investors pay a smaller cost but
can rely only on the public signal IP, which is less precise. In fact, IP is informative
if and only if I = 1, an event realized with probability , while if I = 0 the public
signal is uninformative and the types  and   remain perfectly confounded. The precision
of the public information is summarized by the revelation rate . More formally, signal
observation renes an agent's believe about the true realization of the types. In particular,
an agent who observes a signal I 2 f0;g learns that  2 T;I where
T;I =

 for I = 
T for I = 0
(7)
Dene  2 [0;1] the fraction of active investors at time 1. To make public information a
positive spillover of private information collection I assume that
 = AE (8)
for AE 2 (0;1). As mentioned above, the initial observability (4), the particular binary
choices for the public signal IP 2 f0;g and the form of the spillover function (8) are all
derived from rst principles in Section 3.4.
All agent have to pay a cost to access investment opportunities, but active agents, who
have superior information, face higher costs. For this reason, we can identify with  > 1




In terms of points b) and c) in Section 2, nancial innovation appears to be associated
with in costs A and P, but not with a decrease in . The remaining point a), relating
nancial innovation to greater diversication opportunities, can be modeled in the follow-
ing way. Assume that each investor draws a specialization h in market h = 1;:::;N. Call
ph the fraction of investors with specialization h. Agents are constrained to invest at most




is the barrier to diversication.
The degree of nancial development of an economy is summarized by the vector of distor-
tions D = (A;P;  ). As nancial innovation decreases D, investment costs are reduced
and diversication possibilities improve. As a word of caution, it is worthy to emphasize
that the separate treatment of the barriers   and of the investment costs A, P is a con-
venient artifact but should not be taken too literarily. These variables are all rooted in
the same types of market imperfections that nancial innovation, when benecial, helps to
eradicate. For instance, high barriers   may be due the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion and moral hazard preventing investors to venture in unfamiliar markets, thus forcing
them to concentrate their wealth in a few markets; lack of a centralized nancial market
11for a certain class of assets raises liquidity costs and reduces the number of investors who
trade in those assets; explicit regulatory requirements can restrict the possibility to trade
some types of assets. These same imperfections are also the cause of high investment costs
A;B, which must be interpreted in a broad sense as to include all \the cost of transmitting
information from one party to another" (Merton [1987]). Examples are costly contracting
schemes needed, in the framework of a principal-agent problem, to implement a truth-
ful communication and reduce moral hazard (Holmstr om and Milgrom [1987], Townsend
[1979], Benmelech et al. [2009]).
Finally, it is important to stress that the focus of the paper is not on developing a theory
of endogenous emergence of nancial innovation, the distortions D are in fact treated as
exogenous to the economy.
3.2 Preferences
Agents' preferences are given by an homothetic utility function, which allows a parametric
separation between risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Call fct;Ig
any consumption process for time t = 1;2 chosen by the agent after observing a signal
I 2 f0;g at the beginning of time 1. Conditional on I, consumption c1;I is deterministic,
but consumption c2;I is stochastic, since it depends on the random return at t = 2 of the































Similarly to Epstein and Zin (1989), the utility function disentangles the relative risk
aversion coecient  > 0,  6= 1 from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution   > 0,
  6= 1. As we will see, this choice is made to allows a better interpretations of the results.
Notice also that by setting  = 1
  the usual CRRA utility is obtained.
3.3 The problem of the investor
At time t = 1, an investor rst chooses whether to be active ( = A) or passive ( = P),
then observes the corresponding signal I, and nally makes investment decisions. Invest-
ment choices are given by a saving rate x and a portfolio share m;j for every technology
(m;j) in the economy, subject to the barrier to diversication  . Therefore, given an ex-
































s.t. c1;I = (1   xI)=













Renements (7) imply that for agents with an informative signal I =  uncertainty about
the portfolio return ^ rh stems only from uncertainty on the realization of the productivity
shocks i;e;S. Agents with an uninformative signal I = 0, instead, face further uncertainty
about the types realization. The solution for the optimal portfolio shares is quite intuitive3.
Call h
m;j(I) the optimal portfolio shares of an investor specialized in h when she observes
a signal I. When I =  the investor is informed about the true type and avoids investing
in excess risk technologies. Moreover, since the returns of low risk technologies are i.i.d.
across markets, the best strategy to minimize the remaining risk is to distribute the total
investment as evenly as possible across markets, conditional on the barrier    1=N.
Therefore,
h
m;m() = 0 8m
h
h;3 h() =  
h
m;3 m() = 1  
N 1 m 6= h
(11)
When I = 0 the signal is uninformative and, from the point of view of the investor,
returns on all technologies are identically distributed. Therefore, to minimize risk, the
investment is spread as evenly as possible across technologies, which implies that a share
 =2 is assigned to each of the two technologies in market h and the remaining share 1    
is equally distributed across the other 2(N   1) technologies,
h
h;j(0) =  
2 j = 1;2
h
m;j(0) = 1  
2(N 1) m 6= h;j = 1;2 (12)
3For a detailed derivation see Appendix A
13Substituting for the optimal portfolio shares, we conclude that, for a given , the portfolio
return ^ rh
I of an investor with information I and specialization h is
^ rh








(ih + ihehS) +





Notice that ^ rh
I is independent on . Clearly, an informed investor holds a less risky portfolio








ih(ehS   1) +






] = 0. For a realization , call RI the risk-adjusted return to the portfolio of
an investor with information I and specialization h,




Risk adjusted returns are independent both on h and on the particular realization . Since
^ rh
0 is a mean preserving spread of rh
, a simple application of Jensen's inequality gives
R0 < R
Using the results obtained so far and the homotheticity of the utility function, the optimal
saving rates are found by rewriting VI(;h) = 1

^ VI where
























Since all agents, informed or uninformed, allocate a fraction   of their investment into
their own market of specialization and a fraction 1  
N 1 to each of the other markets, we
can derive aggregate market shares !m, representing the fraction of aggregate investment
devoted by the economy to market m,
!m =  pm +
1    
N   1
(1   pm)
14For instance, when nancial development is at its minimum   = 1, only the fraction pm
of agents with specialization in m invest in m, and thus !m = pm. From a diversication
perspective, some markets will receive too little capital and others too much. Instead,
when nancial development is at its maximum   = 1=N investors can perfectly diversify
their portfolio beyond their original specialization, and thus !m = 1=N for all m.
3.4 The microfundation of the information structure
When collection of information is costly markets cannot be informationally ecient (Gross-
man and Stiglitz [1980]), otherwise the superior information available to active investors
would be costlessly revealed to passive investors by investment choices, which are publicly
observable. However, if the precision of the public information is reduced by the presence
of an aggregate noise, then costly collection of private information can still be valuable.
This idea is formalized by assuming that passive investors observe the investments made
by active investors plus a noise. The noise can be interpreted as created by mistakes in
investment choices or in its measurement, or by the activity of another class of agents,
the liquidity investors, whose portfolio decision is inuenced by random factors, such as
liquidity needs.
Assume that there is a constant amount  L of noisy investment in the economy, dis-
tributed across markets according to the market shares !m. A random variable j with
support [0;  L] determines the total amount of noisy investment which is directed towards
excess risk technologies. Call y(m;j) the sum of active and noisy investment made in
technology (m;j). We then have,
y(m;m) = !mL




 + !m( L   L)
where as usual  is the fraction of investors active in each market. Each active investor
has a net wealth 1=A and a saving rate x
. The quantity !m
A x
 is then the overall
amount of active investment directed to the low risk technology in market m. Call y =
(y(1;1);y(1;2);:::;y(N;1);y(N;2)) and assume that  L < x
=A. Passive investors use the
Bayes rule to deduce the realization of the types from the observation of y. Fix a reference




The value Lj corresponds to the realization of the noise L consistent with a observation
y(m;j) and a realized type m = j in our reference market m. For j = 1;2 dene j 2
T the vector of types consistent with a realization m = j in our reference market m.





15where u() is the probability density function of L. First of all, notice that Probf1jyg +
Probf2jyg = 1 and this is consistent with our initial assumption (4) that agents are
always informed about T = f;  g. Equation (16) generates the structure (6) for the
public signal if, for instance, L is uniformly distributed on [0;  L], as the following example
shows. Assume that m is the true realization of the type in the reference market m, so that




then it is easy to verify that L3 m >  L. Therefore u(Lm) = 1= L, u(L3 m) = 0. Then
Probfmjyg = 1 and Probf3 mjyg = 0. Suppose instead that the realization of the
noise is suciently large, L 

Ax
. Then L3 m   L, u(Lm) = u(L3 m) = 1= L and
hence Probfmjyg = Probf3 mjyg = 1
2. In conclusion, if L <

Ax
 types are revealed
to passive agents by the low level of investment in the excess risk technologies, while if the
noise is suciently large the true type  = m is undistinguishable from   = 3 m.


















In an equilibrium where the revelation rate is strictly positive the fraction of active investors
is also strictly positive. In this situation, the equilibrium revelation rate  makes indierent














 + (1   )^ V
1 
0 ]
where the left hand side is the utility (9) from being active and the right hand side is the
expected utility from being passive. Solving we obtain














Denition 1. An equilibrium is given by
161. investment policies x
I that solve (15), and portfolio policies h
m;j(I) satisfying (11),
(12), given .
2. a revelation rate  equal to the maximum between zero and the value (17), and a
fraction  of active investors satisfying (8).
We have then the following Proposition.








for I 2 f0;g. For interior solutions, the revelation rate is













Proof. Substitute (15) into (14) to obtain (18), which is then substituted into (17) to get
(19).
The equilibrium revelation rate is ultimately a function of the exogenous vector of
distortions D, so we write (D). Since  equalizes the value of being active and passive
the revelation rate turns out to be, not surprisingly, a function of the relative information
cost  and not of A and B separately. We can perform comparative statics exercises to see
how nancial innovation aects  through reductions in the distortions D. In particular,
to mimic the stylized facts suggested in Section 2, I consider exogenous reductions in A;B
and   leaving  unchanged. I restrict my attention to two interesting cases that help us give
a clear interpretation of the forces behind the relation (D). The rst case is obtained
by setting im = 1, so that the low risk technology is risk free and excess risk is both
idiosyncratic em and systemic S. In the second, I set em = 1 so that all technologies have
an idiosyncratic component im and the excess risk is only systemic S. I will also focus on
interior equilibria  > 0.
Proposition 2. Consider changes in D that leave  unchanged. Then,
i) If im = 1 a.s. then (D) is a strictly increasing function.
ii) If em = 1 a.s. then (D) is strictly increasing for   < 1 and strictly decreasing for
  > 1.
Welfare strictly decreases in the distorsions D.
17Proposition 2 show that information collection decreases whenever nancial innovation
favors mostly passive investors relative to active investors. To explain this point it is useful
to analyze the ratios x = x=x0 and R = R=R0 representing, respectively, the saving
rate and risk adjusted return of an informed investor relative to those of an uninformed
investor. In case i) informed investors face no risk at all since R = 1, while passive
investors face idiosyncratic and system risk. Financial development decreases the relative
return R of informed investors by boosting only the return R0 of uninformed investors, who
can better diversify the excess risk they hold. Since active investors are always informed
while passive investors are sometimes uninformed, nancial development favors passive







The excess risk held by uninformed investors is all systemic, hence the relative return R is
unaected by the degree of diversication. In this case, therefore, the channel that allows
D to aect  is not simply the change in R, but is the behavior of the relative saving
rate x. When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is smaller than one x < 1,
because the share of individual wealth consumed by informed investors, who face a higher
return R, is bigger than that of the uninformed investors, who save relatively more to
compensate for their lower return R0. Therefore, even though nancial innovation doesn't
change R, it still favors more uninformed investors (and thus passive investors) who are
the ones that are more exposed to investment risk and then reap overall greater fruits
from the improvement in diversication possibilities. The opposite i true when   > 1, but
this latter case seems much less relevant for macroeconomics, where both the econometric
(Hall [1988]) and the quantitative (Kydland and Prescott [1982]) literature traditionally
consider values of   smaller than 0:5. For em = 1, the elasticity   determines the direction
(decrease/increase) in which  changes in response to a decrease in D, while the relative














) is a strictly positive function. Risk adjusted returns increase with diversi-
cation4, so @R
@(1  ) > 0 for any value of the parameters. The elasticity   determines the sign
of 0
1   while, for given R and 
, @R
@(1  ) > 0 inuences its absolute value. The higher the
risk aversion, the larger is @R
@(1  ), since the greater is the positive diversication eect on
R generated by a small reduction in the distortion  . For instance as  approaches zero
investors become risk neutral and R = 1 for any  , so that @R
@(1  ) = 0. These dierent
roles for   and  cannot be uncovered in the standard formulation  = 1
 .
4Appendix A proves this point formally.
18Having established that nancial innovation tends to decrease information, it is inter-
esting to assess how this aects aggregate welfare and the business cycle. For equilibria
with interior , investors' welfare is simply given by the welfare of active investors ^ V=A.
Welfare gains from nancial innovation come from lower costs A and from a lower barrier  
to diversication, which allows R in (18) to increase. However, these net positive welfare
gains can be greatly reduced by a decrease in the amount of information . The starkest
example is provided by case a), where a decrease in   does not change ^ V. It follows that if
we keep A and B constant, welfare is unaected by a strict decrease in the barrier  . But
how is it possible that higher diversication does not rise the welfare of passive investors,
who are likely to be uninformed and thus to face excess idiosyncratic risk? The answer is
that, in this case, the positive eect of a lower   is exactly oset by an endogenous decrease
in the quality  of public information. The mechanism is that of a typical moral hazard
problem, working through the information externality (8). As diversication possibilities
increase, investors become \more insured" against excess risk and thus, ceteris paribus,
nd it less valuable to take the costly action of collecting private information to eliminate
the chance of facing such risk. In other words, information collection and diversication
are strategic substitutes for investors. The lower collection of private information reduces
the quality  of the public signal, and this impacts negatively on the welfare of passive
investors, exaclty counterbalancing the positive eect of a low  .
Lower public information means that more investors (lower ) invest more often (lower
) in the \wrong technologies", i.e. in technologies with excess risk. This result is impor-
tant and suggests that the nding of Proposition 1 regarding the positive welfare value of
nancial innovation could be quite fragile. Indeed, in Section 4 I extend the basic frame-
work to a more dynamic setting in which risk is time varying and where periods when
excess risk is mainly idiosyncratic are followed by periods when excess risk becomes sys-
temic. I show that nancial development increases the probability of \liquidation crises",
i.e. situations in which investments in excess risk technologies, initially mistakenly under-
taken by uninformed investors, are suddenly liquidated when the increase in systemic risk
triggers a wave of information collection. If liquidation crises impose aggregate costs to
the economy, then nancial innovation can reduce welfare.
To present in simple ways the eect of nancial innovation on the business cycle, I
characterize the equilibrium values of the statistics 2
A and A;S = Cov(A;S)=2
S giving,
respectively, the volatility of the multifactor productivity A and the regression parameter










 + (1   )x
IP
(20)
The multifactor productivity is the overall output at time 2 of the production technologies
divided by time 1 total investment, and is expressed in (20) as the weighted average of
the investors' portfolio return divided by total investment. Dene 2 the volatility of the
19excess risk technologies minus the volatility of i and S, and dene ^ 2
m the dispersion of the
market shares !m,
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(1   ) + O( L)
(21)
Financial innovation, accompanied by a reduction in , has ambiguous eects on aggregate
volatility 2
A. It is a simple exercise6 to show that a lower barrier to diversication   always
reduces the dispersion ^ 2
! of market sizes and thus lowers 2
A. Dispersion of market shares
^ 2
! amplies the eects of idiosyncratic volatility since it allows idiosyncratic shocks to
markets with above average share !m to aect aggregate volatility 2
A. This amplication
operates both on the volatility of shocks i, and to the excess idiosyncratic volatility 2
generated when, with probability 1   , the public signal is uninformative and passive
investor allocate half of their portfolio to excess risk technologies. In the limit of perfect
diversication (  = 1=N) and of a large number of markets (N = 1), ^ 2
! = 0 because
idiosyncratic volatility is washed away in the aggregate. In this case only the systemic
volatility 2
S remains and is amplied by reductions in .
Clear-cut results are obtained for the sensitivity A;S which always increases in 1    . In
fact, the smaller revelation rate increases the frequency at which aggregate productivity is
exposed to the systemic shock which, for low  L, aects approximately half of the aggregate
investment portfolio.
Figure 3 depicts, for a particular numerical example, how the probability density func-
tion of A and the revelation rate  change with  . In particular, I consider the case where
idiosyncratic shocks are symmetric, while the systematic shock is, most of the time, slightly
above it average and rarely much below it. This generates an asymmetric distribution of
S characterized by negative skewness, which captures the notion that negative systematic
events are rare but very destructive since, for instance, they trigger the disruption of part
of the nancial market and large scale liquidations. I also use the standard parametriza-
tion   = 1
 = 0:5 and the relative information cost  is set equal 1:005% . As expected,
5If  L ' 0 then 
 ' 0 and A reects the portfolio choice of only passive investors. This restriction has
no qualitative consequence for our discussion, since the business cycle properties are linked to 
, which
does not depend on  L.
6See Appendix C.
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Figure 3: Probability density function of A (left panel) and revelation rate (right panel) for
minimum (  = 1=N) and maximum (  = 1) barrier to diversication. With equal probability
im 2 f1:18;0:82g and em 2 f1:18;0:82g; S = 1:1 with probability 0.82 and S = 0:57 otherwise;
N = 120;  = 1:005;  = 0:97;   = 1= = 0:5; ph = 0:18  0:82h 1. Computed volatilities:
2
A(  = 1) = 6:3  10 3, 2
A(  = 1=N) = 5:5  10 3.
the equilibrium revelation rate decreases as the barrier   decreases. Since 2
A decreases,
the reduction in ^ 2
! turns out to be the dominating eect on aggregate volatility, while
the sensitivity A;S to the asymmetric systematic shocks, representing negative \tail risk",
increases.
The next section shows how systemic tail risk can be endogenously generated by nan-
cial innovation.
4 Information cycles and liquidation crises
In this section I study the consequences of nancial innovation in a multi-period model
when the risk structure of the economy changes over time, creating endogenous information
cycles and sudden liquidations of excess risk technologies. The main setup is similar to
the one presented in the previous section, with three main dierences. First, the economy
lasts three periods t = 1;2;3 and information and investment choices are made both at
the beginning of time 1 and of time 2. Second, the structure of excess risk is time varying,
since it is all idiosyncratic at time 1 and all systemic at time 2. Third, the systemic shock
at time 2 is partly endogenous, since it depends on the possibility of a \liquidation crisis".
Liquidation shocks take the form of a reduction  in the time 2 returns of all technologies
and occurs if, at the beginning of time 2, public information reveals the types to previously
uninformed investors, thus triggering a wave of liquidations of their investments in excess
risk technologies. The aggregate liquidation cost  can be interpreted, for instance, as
capital adjustment costs arising from the liquidation and reinvestment of capital from
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Figure 4: The extended model with time varying risk: sequence of actions.
costs of a banking crisis, triggered by nancial intermediaries losses in the liquidation of
excess risk technologies, similarly to Diamond and Rajan (2009) and Diamond (1991). The
probability of a liquidation crisis is endogenous, since it depends on the public information
revelation rates, which are ultimately related to the vector of distortions D. Under quite
general assumptions I will show that, absent a reduction in the relative cost of information,
nancial innovation decreases welfare because it increases the probability of liquidation
crises. The reason is that nancial development creates incentives to collect less information
during times when excess risk is idiosyncratic, but does not aect information collection
during periods when excess risk is systemic. In the terms of the model, lower distortions
D decrease the revelation rate at time 1, but does not change the revelation rate at time
2. Consequently, the probability that at time 1 the economy undertakes investments in
excess risk technologies increases, and thus the probability of a liquidation crisis at time 2
raises.
Much of the basic structure of the problem is based on the simple two period model in
Section 3. The timeline is sketched in Figure 4. At the beginning of time 1, agents draw
a specialization h and a type  is realized; depending on their choice 1 = A;P, agents
pay the cost 1, observe the signal I
1
1 and make investment choices. At the beginning of
time 2, time 1 returns are realized and observed; if, at this point, agents that chose 1 = P
are still uninformed, they have another chance to choose 2 = A, pay the cost, and join
the group of active investors, or choose 2 = P and remain passive; time 2 signals I
2
2 are
observed and new investment decisions are made. At the beginning of time 3 returns from
22time 2 investments are realized and agents consume all the proceeds.
I consider the analytically simplest extension of (9) to the three period case by assuming
that the utility function has the following logarithmic7 form
V1;I = expf(1   )lnc1;I + U2g (22)
V2;I = expf(1   )lnc2 + E lnc3;Ig (23)
where, for t = 1;2
Ut = E lnVt;I
For t = 1;2 call rm;j;t the return technology (m;j) between time t and t + 1. Assume that
rm;3 m;1 = 1 (24)
rm;3 m;2 = 1   I
2 (25)
rm;m;1 = 1 + S1(em   1) (26)
rm;m;2 = (1   I
2)S2 (27)
The support of S1 is the set binary f0;1g and ProbfS1 = 1g = s. Shocks S2 and em are
i.i.d., have mean equal to 1, satisfy em;S2 6= 1 almost surely and are independent on S1
and on IP
t . Notice that S1 = 1 corresponds to a state of excess idiosyncratic risk at time
1, while if S1 = 0 excess risk is absent. Moreover, at time t = 2 the economy is overall
more risky, since all the excess risk becomes systemic. This is due to the assumption that
S2 and em are identically distributed: the economy is riskier not because risk increases for
any given technology, but because excess risk becomes perfectly correlated across markets,
and it thus not diversiable. I now turn to the characterization of a liquidation crisis, with
its associated costs  2 (0;1). The indicator function I
2 equals 1 if a liquidation crisis
occurs at time 2, and zero otherwise. From our previous discussion it follows that
I
2 = (1   I

1)[S1 + (1   S1)I

2] (28)
Equation (28) implies that a necessary condition for the occurrence of a liquidation crisis
at time 2 is that public information at time 1 is not revealing (I

1 = 0), so that passive
agents undertake investments at time t = 1 in the excess risk technologies. Liquidation of
these investments takes place if types are revealed at time 2. This happens either because
excess idiosyncratic volatility (S1 = 1) allows passive investors to learn types from the





2 = 1g = (1   1)[ + (1   )2] (29)
7The qualitative results presented do not depend on the logarithmic form. The full extension of utility
(9) to a multiperiod case can be done using Epstein and Zin (1989) recursive preference. This more general
setting is available upon request from the author.
8There is no learning when S1 = 0, since technologies have identical return at time 1.
23where t are the revelation rates at time t associated with two mutually independent9
shocks I

t as in (6).
The complete solution to the model is provided in Appendix D. The crucial variables to
be derived are the revelation rates t. Consistently with the results of Section 3, t will
depend on the relative value at t of the risk adjusted returns. Call ^ rh
1;I the (unadjusted)















1;1 = 1 (31)
The return ^ rh
2;I at time 2 to the portfolio of an investor with information I = ;0 is
^ rh






2; = 1   I

2
Corresponding to the unadjusted returns ^ rh
t;I, the risk-adjusted returns are given by Rt;I,
where
Rt;I = expE lnrh
t;I
for all h.
Proposition 3. Consider an equilibrium with interior revelation rate 
1 > 0. Then,











2 is unchanged and welfare decreases if the barrier
  decreases.



















It suces to show that these inequalities hold when   = 1, since R2;I is unaected by  
while R1;0 is decreasing in   and R;1 = 1. Since em and S2 are identically distributed we











9This is the case if liquidity noises Lt for t = 1;2 are independent of each other.
24where the equality is intended as equality in distribution and "h = (eh 1)(1 S1). Notice
that, since eh and S1 are independent,
E["hj^ rh
1;0 = 1] = E["hjS1 = 0] = 0
E["hj^ rh
1;0 6= 1] = E["hjS1 = 1] = 0
therefore ^ rh
2;0=^ rh
2; is a mean preserving spread of ^ rh
1;0=^ rh





1=AE is the measure of active investors at time 1 then, conditional on
I

1 + S1 = 0, an extra measure (
2   
1)=AE of previously passive investors become active
at time 2.
If   decreases 
2 is unchanged because there is only systemic risk at time 2, while 
1
decreases because there is idiosyncratic risk at time 1. Consequently, the probability 
of a liquidation crisis increases if   is reduced. The eect on welfare is intuitive. The
return at time 1 to the portfolio of an active investor is always ^ rh
1;1 = 1, while the return
at time 2 equals rh
2;1 = 1 if there is no liquidation crisis and rh
2;1 = 1    otherwise. As the
probability of a liquidation crisis increases it becomes more likely that an active investor
faces low returns 1    at time 2, which reduces her time 1 expected utility.
5 Conclusions
The empirical evidence suggests that nancial innovation increases diversication oppor-
tunities and reduces investment costs, but does not reduce the relative cost of information.
I construct an analytically tractable theoretical model that examines how nancial inno-
vation aects incentives to collect costly information about the riskiness of production
technologies. I nd that nancial innovation tends to be associated with lower collection of
private information and thus, via a spillover eect, with lower quality of public information.
This result has important implications for the business cycle, since aggregate productivity
becomes more subject to systemic shocks, even when its overall volatility decreases. Recent
empirical evidence shows that in the US agents have indeed shifted over time from active
to passive investment strategies. Higher diversication and lower investment costs improve
welfare, even though the lower quality of information has a negative eects on passive in-
vestors. In an extended model where risk is time varying risk, nancial innovation increases
the probability of liquidity crises. In fact, nancial innovation lowers information collection
during periods in which excess risk is mainly idiosyncratic and thus increases the frequency
at which uninformed agents mistakenly invest in excess risk technologies. Liquidity crises
arise when the excess risk becomes systemic: information collection rises and triggers a
wave of liquidation. If liquidation crises impose aggregate costs to the economy then -
nancial innovation can decrease welfare. The paper shows that nancial innovation and
endogenous information collection can be intertwined in important ways. More research
on this issue is certainly needed.
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28Appendix A
I nd the optimal portfolio shares 
m;j(I) and show that risk adjusted retruns decrease in
the barrier  . The proof is in ve steps.
Step 1) Assume I = 0. From the point of view of a passive investors, all technologies
have identically distributed returns. The return on technology (j;m) can then be written
as
rm;j = (1   jj   mj)imemS + jj   mjim
Notice that
rm;1 + rm;2 = im(1 + emS)
I show that any choice of portfolio shares h
j;m such that h
h;1+h
h;2 =   provides less utility
than the choice ~ h
m;j such that
~ h
m;j = 1  
2 m 6= h
~ h
j;m = h







= (1    )
X
m














m;j   ~ h
m;j)rm;j
Notice that
q = q~  + ~ z
Since im and em are i.i.d. across m we have
E[imjq~ ] = E[injq~ ] m;n 6= h
E[emjq~ ] = E[enjq~ ] m;n 6= h
Therefore,
E[rm;jjq~ ] = E[rn;kjq~ ]  r j;k = 1;2 m;n 6= h
and then




m;j   ~ h
m;j) = 0






Step 2) Assume I = 0. I show that the portfolio ~  constructed in Step 1 is dominated by
portfolio  with
h
m;m = ~ h
m;m m 6= h
h
m;j =  
2 m = h
Similarly to Step 1 dene q and z as
q = (1    )
X
m










Since q is independent of  it follows that
E[rh;1jq] = E[rh;2jq]
and then again E[zjq] = 0. Since q~  = q + z then q~  is a mean preserving spread of q.











m;m = 0 8m





Since em and S are independent from q, then E[zjq = 0]. The portfolio q = q + z is a
mean preserving spread of q.
Step 4) Assume I 2 f;0g. For any   I have constructed in Step 2-3 two correspond-
ing portfolios h
m;j( ) as a function of the barrier  . For an agent with specialization h
and information I, the corresponding return q satises q( ) = ^ rh
I( ), with rh
I given in
Section 3. We can write
^ rh
I( ) = (1    )
X
m6=h
rm +  rh
30where rm is the average return in market m obtained by averaging the contribution of each






. We can write,
^ rh
I( ) = ^ rh
I(1=N) + z
 =
N     1
N






It is easy to show that E[zj^ rh
I(1=N)] = 0. Without loss of generality assume that  < 1.
Choose  0 >    1
N so that 0 >   0. Notice that, by concavity,
[^ rh




























Conditional on any value of (1=N), Jensen's inequality gives
E[^ rh
































This proves that as   decreases the risk adjusted return of the investors' portfolios increase.
31Appendix B
In this appendix I present the signal extraction problem of passive investors. Choose any




The realization of the noise L satises L 2 fL1;L2g. Hence, for every every market m0 and








= Lj , m = j0
In this way, we associate to each realization L = Lj one and only one vector of types. More
precisely, for a realization ^ y, call j the unique vector of types associated with the event
fL = Ljg \ fy = ^ yg. Notice that the true type  satises
m = 
where m is type true realization in our reference market m. Notice also that
j =  3 j (33)
Using Bayes rule (for continuous variables) and the arguments above we have
Probf = jjy = ^ yg = ProbfL = Ljjy = ^ yg
=
u(Lj)Probfy = ^ yjLjg









This appendix computes the business cycle statistics and establishes the monotonicity of
^ 2












Conditional on an informative signal IP =  all the agents invest in the low risk technolo-
gies, thus the productivity A is
A = A















Recalling that  = =AE we derive the unconditional covariance Cov(A;S) as
Cov(A;S) =E[Cov(A;SjI = 0)] + E[Cov(A;SjI = )]
=E[Cov(A;SjI = 0)]
=E[Cov(A0;SjI = 0)] +












33The unconditional variance is
2
A =E[V ar(AjI = 0)] + E[V ar(AjI = )]














=AEE[Cov(A0;A   A0jI = 0] + E[V ar(AjI = )]
=E[V ar(AjI = 0)] + E[V ar(A0jI = )] + O( L)
=(1   )V ar(A0) + V ar(A) + O( L)
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@(1    )
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1
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The above equation established that the variance 2






















N, then also ^ 2
! decreases in 1    .
34Appendix D
Here I provide the solution to the extended model. The revelation rates t are solved by
backward induction. Conditional on I

1 + S1 = 0, call V2;I(w) the value at time 2 of a
passive investor with information I 2 f;0g and wealth w,
V2;I(w) = max
x expf(1   )ln(1   x)w + E lnxw^ rh
2;Ig
The rst order condition gives x =  which implies
V2;I(w) = w(1   )1 (R2;I)
The revelation rate 
2 is found by equalizing at any state the expected continuation value
U2, per unit of wealth, of an active investor to that of an passive,
E lnV2;(1=A) = 
2E lnV2;(1=P) + (1   
2)V2;0(1=P)
Recall that, conditional on I

1 + S1 = 0, the revelation of information (I

2 = 1) at time 2
causes all technologies to suer a liquidation cost . Solving the equation above gives the
revelation rate 
2.
Given a continuation value U2 per unit of wealth, the revelation rate 
1 is found by equating
the value U1, per unit of wealth, of an active and passive investor at the beginning of time
1. Dene the values V1;I(w) as
V1;I(w) = max
x expf(1   )ln(1   x)w + E lnxw^ rh
1;IU2g
The optimal investment is again x = . The solution is
V2;I(w) = w(1   )1 (R1;I)EU

2
The revelation rate 
1 then solves the following equation
lnV1;(w=A) = 
1 lnV1;(w=P) + (1   1)lnV1;0(w=P)
35Appendix E
This appendix provides details for the construction of the series in Figure 1. All data
are taken from the Tables in French (2008). Starting from the top panel, the active and
passive costs for DB plans are reported in Table III. For the bottom panel, the cost of the
composite passive strategy is given in Table VII, column \Total Cost". I construct the
composite active strategy as a weighted average of investments in mutual funds, pension
funds and hedge funds. The weight for the mutual funds is constructed using the market
share for Open-end funds in Table I. This probably slightly overestimates by how much
this component has decreased, since mutual funds has shifted overtime towards passive
strategies, which are less costly. Nonetheless in 2006 as much as 88% of the Open-end
funds are dened as active (Table II). The weight of the pension funds is constructed
summing the shares of DB plans and DC plans in Table I. The weight for hedge funds is
constructed using the share in Table I. The cost of Open-end funds is given in Table II,
column \Total". The costs of pension funds is the cost of active DB plans in Table III.
The cost of the hedge funds is the one reported in Table IV under \Hedge Fund plus Fund
of Funds"; I ll the missing values for dates prior to 1996 by using 9:27%, which is the
1996 value. This has no signicant impact on the estimation of the cost index, since hedge
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